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Ontological Interpretable Conceivable Ideas' Substance B.

If we dare to define Ontology in terms of Philosophically necessary idea and own significant notion. It'd be some very our brain conceivable own comprehending approachable mind's description.


And that thing basically is different from our bodily tangibly sensing, and it indicates rather very nominal mutually laid between substance and name as own our socially necessary recognizable consensus. Though that nature is definitely gapped from our own sensing nervous functioned sensing or that working deriving own physical substantial sensibility, rather very our lexicon abiding own naming necessity's indicative interpreting. Though that is our social protcol.


And what makes us define so must be caused from what our each sensing nerve's activity is never depictable, because eaAh tangible sensing is only left to each one's own cognitive acceptance. At least at Occidental Philosophy's orthodox context must be interpreted so.


In other words, at least at Logics abiding Philosophy's context, identity not clearly evidenced with data reference must be regarded so merely ambiguous then, we should eliminate it at least at nominal index or kind of credible criterion.


In other words, at least for Philosophers specifically Analytical ones must have an idea around bodily tangible and spiritually mind's holding various emotionally touchy and very subtle mind's emotional nuence must be very notionally and nominally ambiguous and uncertain at least describable necessity.

That mind, sensation or emotional nature generally at least in terms of Philosophy regarded as not clearly identified substance.


And that mind's idea must have temptation around mystified substance so specified value unnecessarily signified.


Though, in terms of Philosophy, any seen cognitively sensed all these presence arbitrarily are denied at the context of clearly definable subject as cognitive notion. Because that mind's mood could have been some unreasonable illusion or so.


(Irregularly continued)




Mar. 1st.    2023